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Abstract
This paper analyzes spillovers from macroeconomic shocks in systemic economies
(China, the Euro Area, and the United States) to the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region as well as outward spillovers from a GDP shock in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries and MENA oil exporters to the rest of the world. This
analysis is based on a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model, estimated for 38
countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2. Spillovers are transmitted across
economies via trade, nancial, and commodity price linkages. The results show that
the MENA countries are more sensitive to developments in China than to shocks in the
Euro Area or the United States, in line with the direction of evolving trade patterns and
the emergence of China as a key driver of the global economy. Outward spillovers from
the GCC region and MENA oil exporters are likely to be stronger in their immediate
geographical proximity, but also have global implications.
JEL Classications: C32, E17, E32, F44, O53, Q41.
Keywords: Global VAR (GVAR), interconnectedness, global macroeconomic mod-
eling, impulse responses, macroeconomic shocks, international business cycle.
We are grateful to Alberto Behar, Rishi Goyal, Malhar Nabar, and Alasdair Scott, as well as seminar
participants at the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the University of St
Andrews for constructive comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under
the title A Global VAR Model of MENA Business Cycles. The views expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund or IMF policy.
yCorresponding author. Email address: mraissi@imf.org.
1 Introduction
The GVAR literature almost exclusively focuses on business cycle linkages among advanced
and major emerging market economies, with limited attention to growth spillovers to/from
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) region. While the international business cycle is very important for the
MENA regionss economic performance, macroeconomic and political developments in this
region also have large consequences for the rest of the world, due to the abundance of natural
resources in the Middle East and North Africa. We use a GVAR model to disentangle the
size and speed of the transmission of di¤erent macroeconomic shocks originating from three
systemic countries to the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia),
Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria), and GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE) regions, as well as outward spillovers from the MENA region to the
rest of the world. We also focus on the emergence of China as a global force in the world
economy, and study how changes in trade patterns between China and the rest of the world
may have a¤ected the transmission of the international business cycle to MENA countries
and other systemic economies.
Our approach uses a dynamic multi-country framework for the analysis of the interna-
tional transmission of shocks and is based on the model developed in Cashin et al. (2012).
The framework comprises 38 country/region-specic models, among which is a single Euro
Area region (comprising 8 of the 11 countries that joined the Euro on January 1, 1999)
as well as the GCC region. These individual models are solved in a global setting where
core macroeconomic variables of each economy are related to corresponding foreign variables
(constructed exclusively to match the international trade pattern of the country under con-
sideration). The model has both real and nancial variables: real GDP, ination, real equity
price, real e¤ective exchange rate, short and long-term interest rates, a measure of global
oil production, and the price of oil. This framework is able to account for various trans-
mission channels, including not only trade relationships but also nancial and commodity
price linkages see Dees et al. (2007) for more details. Compared to Dees et al. (2007),
the current paper advances the work on GVAR modelling in the following directions: (i) we
extend the geographical coverage of the GVAR model to the Middle East and North Africa
region as well as to other major oil-exporters; (ii) we add a measure of global oil production
to the GCC model to account for supply side factors in the world oil market, as many supply
shortfalls originate in the MENA region (for instance, the more recent Arab Spring and asso-
ciated supply shortfalls from Libya, or the e¤ects of sanctions on Iran and the resulting drop
in its oil exports); and (iii) we investigate the growing impact of Chinas macroeconomic
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shocks on other systemic economies, the MENA region in general, and major oil exporters
in particular.
We estimate the GVAR model based on two sets of xed trade weights at di¤erent points
in time, being 20 years apart. Specically, we make use of a set of weights averaged over 1986
and 1988 and another between 2006 to 2008. This allows us to study how the transmission of
shocks has changed following the emergence of China as a major driver of the world economy.
Our results, using quarterly data between 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, indicate that the impact of
a Chinese GDP shock on a typical MENA economy, as well as on other systemic countries
and oil exporters, has increased signicantly since the mid-1980s. A negative GDP shock
in China (using the 200608 weights) would have major global repercussions, especially for
less-diversied commodity exporters. The e¤ects on other systemic countries are smaller
but not trivial. At the same time, the impact of a U.S. GDP shock on a typical MENA
economy is large, and has not changed signicantly since the mid-1980s. We also nd that
outward spillovers from the GCC and MENA oil exporters are likely to be stronger in their
immediate geographical proximity, but they also have implications for systemic economies
and other major oil exporters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GVAR methodology
while Section 3 outlines our modelling approach and presents the country-specic estimates
and tests. Section 4 focuses on the potential macroeconomic consequences of a GDP shock in
systemic countries. Section 5 investigates the extent to which the macroeconomic conditions
in the GCC region and MENA oil exporters a¤ect, and are a¤ected by, the global economy.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Global VAR (GVAR) Methodology
We consider N + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 0; 1; :::; N . With the
exception of the United States, which we label as 0 and take to be the reference country,
all other N countries are modelled as small open economies. This set of individual VARX*
models is used to build the GVAR framework. Following Pesaran (2004) and Dees et al.
(2007), a VARX* (si; si ) model for the ith country relates a ki  1 vector of domestic
macroeconomic variables (treated as endogenous), xit, to a ki  1 vector of country-specic
foreign variables (taken to be weakly exogenous), xit, and to a md  1 vector of observed
global factors, dt, which could include such variables as commodity prices:
i (L; si)xit = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; s

i )x

it +i (L; s

i )dt + uit; (1)
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for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where ai0 and ai1 are ki  1 vectors of xed intercepts and coe¢ cients
on the deterministic time trends, respectively, and uit is a ki  1 vector of country-specic
shocks, which we assume are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-singular co-
variance matrix, ii, namely uit s i:i:d: (0;ii). Furthermore, i (L; si) = I  
Psi
i=1iL
i,
i (L; s

i ) =
Psi
i=0iL
i, and i (L; si ) =
Psi
i=0iL
i are the matrix lag polynomial of the
coe¢ cients associated with the domestic, foreign, and global variables, respectively. As the
lag orders for these variables, si and si ; are selected on a country-by-country basis, we are
explicitly allowing for i (L; si), i (L; si ), and i (L; s

i ) to di¤er across countries.
The country-specic foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the
domestic variables using data on bilateral trade as the weights, wij :
xit =
NX
j=0
wijxjt; (2)
where j = 0; 1; :::N; wii = 0; and
PN
j=0wij = 1. For empirical application, the trade weights
are computed as xed weights based on the average trade ows measured over the period
2006 to 2008. However, the weights can be based on any time period and can be allowed to
be time-varying.
Although estimation is done on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved
for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all variables are endogenous to the
system as a whole. After estimating each country VARX*(si; si ) model separately, all the
k =
PN
i=0 ki endogenous variables, collected in the k  1 vector xt = (x00t;x01t; :::;x0Nt)0, need
to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix dened in terms of the country-specic
weights. To see this, we can write the VARX* model in equation (1) more compactly as:
Ai (L; si; s

i ) zit = 'it; (3)
for i = 0; 1; :::; N; where
Ai (L; si; s

i ) = [i (L; si) i (L; si )] ; zit = (x0it;x0it)0 ;
'it = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; s

i )dt + uit: (4)
Note that given equation (2) we can write:
zit =Wixt; (5)
whereWi = (Wi0;Wi1; :::;WiN) withWii = 0 is the (ki + ki )k weight matrix for country
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i dened by the country-specic weights, wij. Using (5) we can write equation (3) as:
Ai (L; s)Wixt = 'it; (6)
whereAi (L; s) is constructed fromAi (L; si; si ) by setting s = max (s0; s1; :::; sN ; s

0; s

1; :::; s

N)
and augmenting the s   si or s   si additional terms in the power of the lag operator by
zeros. Stacking (6), we obtain the Global VAR(s) model in domestic variables only:
G (L; s)xt = 't; (7)
where
G (L; s) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
A0 (L; s)W0
A1 (L; s)W1
.
.
.
AN (L; s)WN
1CCCCCCCCCA
; 't =
0BBBBBBBBB@
'0t
'1t
.
.
.
'Nt
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (8)
For an illustration of the solution of the GVAR model, using a VARX*(1; 1) model,
see Pesaran (2004), and for a detailed exposition of the GVAR methodology see Dees et al.
(2007). The GVAR(s) model in equation (7) can be solved recursively and used for a number
of purposes, such as forecasting or impulse response analysis.
3 A Global VAR Model Including the MENA Region
We extend the country coverage of the GVAR dataset used in Dees et al. (2007) by adding
14 countries located in the Middle East and North Africa region as well as three other
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members (see Table 1). Thus,
our version of the GVAR model includes 50 countries, covering over 90% of world GDP as
opposed to the "standard" 33 country set-up used in the literature, see Smith and Galesi
(2010). Of the 50 countries included in our sample, 17 are oil exporters, of which 10 are
current OPEC members and one is a former member (Indonesia left OPEC in January 2009).
We were not able to include Angola and Iraq, the remaining two OPEC members, due to the
lack of su¢ ciently long time series data. We therefore, extend the country coverage both in
terms of major oil exporters and also by including an important region of the world when it
comes to oil supply, the MENA region.
For empirical application, we create two regions, one of which comprises the six Gulf
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Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and the other is the Euro Area block comprising 8 of
the 11 countries that initially joined the Euro in 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the GCC block and
the Euro Area block are constructed as cross-sectionally weighted averages of the domestic
variables (described in detail below), using Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights, averaged
over the 2006-2008 period. Thus, as displayed in Table 1, the GVAR model that we specify
includes 38 country/region-specic VARX* models.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model Including MENA
MENA Oil Exporters Systemic Countries Other Oil Exporters
Algeria China Canada
GCC Countries Euro Area Ecuador
Bahrain Austria Indonesia
Kuwait Belgium Mexico
Oman Finland Nigeria
Qatar France Norway
Saudi Arabia Germany Venezuela
UAE Italy
Iran Netherlands Latin America
Libya Spain Argentina
Japan Brazil
MENA Oil Importers United Kingdom Chile
Egypt United States Peru
Jordan
Mauritania Emerging Asia Rest of the World
Morocco Korea Australia
Syria Malaysia India
Tunisia Philippines New Zealand
Turkey Singapore South Africa
Thailand Sweden
Switzerland
Notes: indicates that the country has been added to the Smith and Galesi (2010) database. Countries in
italics are included in a region for estimation purposes.
3.1 Variables
The macroeconomic variables included in the individual VARX* models depend on both the
modelling strategy employed as well as whether data on a particular variable is available.
Each country-specic model has a maximum of six domestic (endogenous) variables and
ve foreign (exogenous) variables. We also include two global variables, each of which is
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treated endogenously in only one country, while being weakly exogenous in the remaining
37 country models. Below, we describe the di¤erent variables included in our model and
provide justication for our modelling specication. For various data sources used to build
the quarterly GVAR dataset, covering 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, see the Data Appendix.
3.1.1 Domestic Variables
Real GDP, yit, the rate of ination, it, short-term interest rate, rSit, long-term interest
rate, rLit, and real equity prices, eqit are the ve domestic variables that are included in our
model, as well as most of the GVAR applications in the literature. These ve variables are
constructed as:
yit = ln(GDPit); it = pit   pit 1; pit = ln(CPIit); eqit = ln (EQit=CPIit) ;
rSit = 0:25 ln(1 +R
S
it=100); r
L
it = 0:25 ln(1 +R
L
it=100); (9)
where GDPit is the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, CPIit is the
consumer price index, EQit is a nominal Equity Price Index, and RSit (R
L
it) is the short-term
(long-term) interest rate.
The GVAR literature also typically includes a sixth domestic variable, representing the
real exchange rate and dened as eit   pit, that is the log of the nominal exchange rate
of country i, ln (Eit) ; deated by the domestic CPI. However, in a multi-country set-up, it
might be better to consider a measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate, rather than eit pit.
We therefore follow Dees et al. (2007) and construct such a variable, reerit.
To construct the real e¤ective exchange rate for country i, we simply take the nominal
e¤ective exchange rate, neerit, add the log of foreign price level (pit) and subtract the do-
mestic (pit) price level. Note that neerit is a weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates
between country i and all of its trading partners j, where j = 0; :::; N: In the current appli-
cation, we have a total of 36 countries and two regions in our model, N = 37; therefore, we
can use the nominal exchange rates denominated in United States dollars for each country,
eit, to calculate reerit. More specically,
reerit = neerit + p

it   pit
=
37X
j=0
wij (eit   ejt) + pit   pit; (10)
where the foreign price is calculated as the weighted sum of log price level indices (pjt) of
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country is trading partners, pit =
37X
j=0
wijpjt, and wij is the trade share of country j for
country i. Given that
37X
j=0
wij = 1 and eit =
37X
j=0
wijejt, the real e¤ective exchange rate can
be written as:
reerit = eit   eit + pit   pit
= (eit   pit)  (eit   pit) : (11)
This constructed measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate is then included in our model
as the sixth domestic variable.
3.1.2 Foreign Variables
We include ve foreign variables in our model. In particular, all domestic variables, except for
that of the real e¤ective exchange rate, have corresponding foreign variables. The exclusion
of reerit is simply because reerit already includes both domestic, eit   pit, and foreign,
eit  pit, nominal exchanges rates deated by the appropriate price levels, see equation (11).
Therefore, reerit does not by itself have any economic meaning. The foreign variables are
all computed as in equation (2), or more specically:
yit =
37X
j=0
wijyjt; eq

it =
37X
j=0
wijeqjt; 

it = p

it   pit 1
rSit =
37X
j=0
wijr
S
jt; r
L
it =
37X
j=0
wijr
L
jt: (12)
The trade weights, wij, are computed as a three-year average to reduce the impact of
individual yearly movements on the weights:1
wij =
Tij;2006 + Tij;2007 + Tij;2008
Ti;2006 + Ti;2007 + Ti;2008
; (13)
where Tijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and Tit =
PN
j=0 Tijt
(the total trade of country i) for t = 2006; 2007; 2008; in the case of all countries. The trade
shares used to construct the foreign variables are given in the 38  38 matrix provided in
1A similar approach has also typically been followed in Global VAR models estimated in the literature.
See, for example, Dees et al. (2007).
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Table 7 of the Data Appendix.
3.1.3 Global Variables
Given the importance of oil price and production for the MENA region, we also include
nominal oil prices (in United States dollars), P oilt , as well as the quantity of oil produced
in the world, Qoilt , in our model. As is now standard in the literature, we include log oil
prices, poilt , as a "global variable" determined in the U.S. VARX* model; that is the price
of oil is included in the U.S. model as an endogenous variable while it is treated as weakly
exogenous in the model for all other countries. The main reason for this is that the U.S. is
the worlds largest oil consumer. On average, about 27% of the world oil between 19792010
was consumed by the U.S., which is far larger than compared to the other three major oil
importers in the world (China, Euro area, and Japan), even when combined.
On the other hand, the GCC countries produce more than 22% of world oil and export
around 30% of the world total. They also possess 36% of the worlds proven oil reserves, and
Saudi Arabia, by itself, has the largest spare capacity in the world. Thus, we include log of
oil production, qoilt , as an endogenous variable in the GCC block, and as a weakly exogenous
variable in all other countries. qoilt is therefore the second "global variable" in our model.
2
Making one region out of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates, is not without economic reasoning. The rationale is that the GCC countries
have in recent decades implemented a number of policies and initiatives to foster economic
and nancial integration with a view to establishing a monetary union based on the Euro
Area model. Given the increased integration of these economies over the last three decades,
the peg to a common currency (the United States dollar), exible labor markets, and open
capital accounts, it is therefore reasonable to group these countries as one region.3
3.2 MENA Trade Weights
The Middle East and North African countries are globally less competitive relative to their
peers. The Middle East accounts for less than 1% of world non-fuel exports, compared with
4% from Latin America, and of its limited global export share, inter-regional trade accounts
for less than a tenth, barely more than in 1960. The usual explanation for the poor trade
performance in the region is its reliance on crude oil exports, and hence little success in
developing signicant merchandise exports. Furthermore, since most countries in the region
export the same products oil and gasthey naturally do not tend to actively trade with
2For a more detailed discussion of oil supply and price modelling in the GVAR model see Cashin et al.
(2012).
3See Mohaddes and Williams (2012) for more details.
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each other (see Table 2). More trade would enable rms to reap greater economies of scale,
increase returns to investment, adopt superior technology, and hence, it would promote
growth.4
Table 2: MENA Trade Weights
(a) Averages Over 19861988 (b) Averages Over 20062008
Notes: Trade weights are computed as shares of exports and imports, displayed in columns by region (such
that a column, but not a row, sum to 1). Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF.
Looking specically at Table 2b, we note that the Euro Area is the most important trading
partner for the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). More
than 48% of their trade originates in or is destined for the Euro Area. U.S. and China are
also large trading partners for the Maghreb, with the weights ranging between 322% and
225% with the U.S. and China, respectively. However, Maghrebs trade with the GCC is
generally limited to less than 1% of total trade in all countries except for Morocco (for which
it is 6%).
On the other hand, the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) trade much more
with the GCC, where the shares are between 1328%.5 The Euro Area is nevertheless very
important for the region as between 1632% of Mashreq trade is destined for or originates
in the eight Euro Area countries in our sample. Europe is also an important trading partner
for Turkey (45%), as compared to China, the GCC, UK, and the U.S., where the individual
4See Behar and Freund (2011) for an extensive discussion of the trade performance of the MENA region
over the past 15 years.
5See Mohaddes and Raissi (2011) for more details regarding the link between the Mashreq countries and
the GCC.
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trade weights are just above 6%. Irans largest trading partner is the Euro area (24%), but
it also trades substantially with China, the GCC countries, and Japan (all exceeding 12%).
Comparing with other countries in the MENA region, the GCCs trade is less concentrated
on one country/region, trading more than 10% with China, Euro Area, Japan and the U.S.
individually. However, as mentioned before, this is mainly due to oil exports to di¤erent
regions rather than having a more diversied export basket/market.
Comparing the more recent trade weights, averaged over 20062008, with those from 20
years ago in Table 2a, we see that for the MENA region as a whole trade with the Euro Area
has fallen, but trade with China has increased many fold for all countries. On the other hand,
trade with the U.S. has increased for some but decreased for others, while trade between the
region and GCC has remained more or less stable, except for Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria
for which it has increased between 8 (Iran) and 20 (Syria) percentage points, respectively.
Overall Table 2 illustrates the continuing importance of the Euro Area countries in our
sample for the MENA region, but also shows that both China and the U.S. are important
for the region. We will therefore focus on spillovers from these three systemic economies to
MENA countries in Section 4. Moreover, given the emergence of China in the world economy
and its increasing importance for the MENA region, and for the largest oil exporters in the
world in particular, we shall also illustrate how Chinas impact on the region and other
systemic economies has changed over the past two decades.
Table 2 also illustrates that trade between the GCC and other MENA countries is large
for a few economies but small for others. This is also the case for the overall trade between
the GCC and the rest of the world: the GCC trade weights for China, Euro Area and the
U.S. are between 34%, although trade with India is more than 20% and the trade shares
with Japan and Korea are more than 12%, see Table 7. However, given the importance of
the Persian Gulf in determining oil supply (and eventually oil prices), we expect the GCCs
performance to have a global impact through the commodity channel rather than purely via
the trade one. Thus, we look at spillovers from the GCC to the rest of the world in Section
5.
3.3 Model Specication
Given the discussion in Section 3.1, we specify three di¤erent sets of individual country-
specic models. The rst specication is common across all countries apart from the United
States and the GCC block. These 36 VARX* models include six endogenous/domestic
variables, when available, ve country-specic foreign variables, and two global variables
(see Table 3). Using the same terminology as in equation (1), the 61 vector of endogenous
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and the 51 vector of exogenous variables are given by xit =

yit; it; eqit; r
S
it; r
L
it; reerit
0
and xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
respectively, while the 2 1 vector of global variables is
dened as dt =

poilt ; q
oil
t
0
:
The second specication relates to the GCC block only, for which the log of oil production,
qoilt , is included in the model endogenously in addition to the 3 domestic variables in xit,
while xit and the log of nominal oil prices, p
oil
t , are included as weakly exogenous variables.
Finally, the U.S. model is specied di¤erently from the others, mainly because of the
dominance of the United States in the world economy. Firstly, based on the discussion
above regarding oil consumption, the price of oil is included in the model endogenously.
Secondly, given the importance of U.S. nancial variables in the global economy, the U.S.-
specic foreign nancial variables, eqUS;t, and r
L
US;t, are not included in this model. The
exclusion of these two variables was also conrmed by our preliminary analysis, in which
the weak exogeneity assumption was rejected for eqUS;t and r
L
US;t in the U.S. model. Finally,
since eit is expressed as domestic currency price of a United States dollar, eUS;t   pUS;t, it is
by construction determined outside this model. Thus, instead of the real e¤ective exchange
rate, we included eUS;t   pUS;t as a weakly exogenous foreign variable in the U.S. model.
Table 3: Variables Specication of the Country-Specic VARX* Models
The U.S. Model The GCC Model All Other Models
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
yUS;t y

US;t yGCC;t y

GCC;t yit y

it
US;t 

US;t GCC;t 

GCC;t it 

it
eqUS;t     eqGCC;t eqit eqit
rSUS;t r
S
US;t   rSGCC;t rSit rSit
rLUS;t     rLGCC;t rLit rLit
  eUS;t   pUS;t reerGCC;t   reerit  
poilt     poilt   poilt
  qoilt qoilt     qoilt
Notes: See equations (9) and (11) for the denition of the variables.
3.4 Country-Specic Estimates and Tests
Initial estimations and tests of the individual VARX*(si; si ) models are conducted under the
assumption that the country-specic foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous and
integrated of order one, I (1), and that the parameters of the models are stable over time.
As both assumptions are needed for the construction and the implementation of the GVAR
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model, we will test and provide evidence for these assumptions in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
For the interpretation of the long-run relations, and also to ensure that we do not work
with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables, we need to consider the unit root properties of
the core variables in our country-specic models (see Table 3). If the domestic, xit, foreign,
xit, and global, dt, variables included in the country-specic models are indeed integrated of
order one, I (1), we are not only able to distinguish between short- and long-run relations but
also to interpret the long-run relations as cointegrating. Therefore, we perform Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the level and rst di¤erences of all the variables. However, as
the power of unit root tests are often low, we also utilize the weighted symmetric ADF test
(ADF-WS) of Park and Fuller (1995), as it has been shown to have better power properties
than the ADF test. This analysis results in over 3200 unit root tests, which overall, as a
rst-order approximation, support the treatment of the variables in our model as being I(1).
For brevity, these test results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon
request.
3.4.1 Lag Order Selection, Cointegrating Relations, and Persistence Proles
We use quarterly observations over the period 1979Q22011Q2, across the di¤erent specica-
tions in Table 3, to estimate the 38 country/region-specic VARX*(si; si ) models. However,
prior to estimation, we need to determine the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables,
si and si . For this purpose, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) applied to the
underlying unrestricted VARX* models. However, given the constraints imposed by data
limitations, we set the maximum lag orders to smax = 2 and smax = 1. The selected VARX*
orders are reported in Table 4, from which we can see that for most countries a VARX*(2; 1)
specication seems satisfactory, except for seven countries (Australia, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia,
Mexico, Singapore, and the United Kingdom), for which s = s = 1 is selected by AIC.
Having established the order of the 38 VARX* models, we proceed to determine the num-
ber of long-run relations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegration,
one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried out using Johansens maximal eigenvalue
and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous
I (1) regressors, unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose the num-
ber of cointegrating relations (ri) based on the trace test statistics, given that it has better
small sample properties than the maximal eigenvalue test, initially using the 95% critical
values from MacKinnon (1991).6
We then consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks on the exactly identied cointegrating
6To save space the lag order and cointegration test results are not reported here but are available on
request.
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Table 4: Lag Orders of the Country-Specic VARX*(s,s*) Models Together with
the Number of Cointegrating Relations (r)
VARX* Order Cointegrating VARX* Order Cointegrating
Country si si relations (ri) Country si s

i relations (ri)
Algeria 2 1 1 Morocco 2 1 1
Argentina 2 1 2 Mauritania 2 1 1
Australia 1 1 3 Mexico 1 1 2
Brazil 2 1 1 Nigeria 2 1 2
Canada 2 1 2 Norway 2 1 3
China 2 1 1 New Zealand 2 1 3
Chile 2 1 2 Peru 2 1 1
Ecuador 2 1 1 Philippines 2 1 1
Egypt 1 1 2 South Africa 2 1 1
Euro Area 2 1 1 Singapore 1 1 2
GCC 2 1 2 Sweden 2 1 3
India 2 1 1 Switzerland 2 1 2
Indonesia 2 1 2 Syria 2 1 2
Iran 1 1 1 Thailand 2 1 2
Japan 2 1 2 Tunisia 2 1 1
Jordan 2 1 3 Turkey 2 1 1
Korea 2 1 1 UK 1 1 1
Libya 2 1 1 USA 2 1 2
Malaysia 1 1 1 Venezuela 2 1 1
Notes: si and si denote the lag order for the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The number of cointegrating relations (ri) are selected using
the trace test statistics based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all countries except
for Australia, Euro Area, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand,
Tunisia, and the United States, for which we use the 95% simulated critical values computed by stochastic
simulations and 1000 replications, and for Canada, China, Korea, Peru, Philippines, the UK, for which we
reduced ri below that suggested by the trace statistic to ensure the stability of the global model.
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vectors using persistence proles developed by Lee and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin
(1996). On impact the persistence proles (PPs) are normalized to take the value of unity,
but the rate at which they tend to zero provides information on the speed with which
equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks. The PPs could initially over-shoot,
thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if the vector under consideration is
indeed cointegrated. In our preliminary analysis of the PPs, we noticed that the speed of
convergence was very slow for some countries and for a few the system-wide shocks never
really died out. In particular, the speed of adjustment was very slow for the following 18
countries (with ri based on critical values from MacKinnon (1991) in brackets): Australia
(4), Canada (4), China (2), Euro Area (2), Indonesia (3), Iran (2), Japan (3), Korea (4),
Malaysia (2), Peru (3), Philippines (2), South Africa (2), Singapore (3), Switzerland (3),
Thailand (3), Tunisia (2), the United Kingdom (2), and the United States (3).
Moreover, we noticed that a couple of eigenvalues of the GVAR model were larger than
unity. Therefore, to ensure the stability of the global model, as well as to deal with the
possible overestimation of the number of cointegrating relations based on asymptotic critical
values, we estimated a cointegrating VARX* model, based on the lag orders in Table 4, for
each of the 18 countries separately and used the trace test statistics together with the 95%
simulated critical values, computed by stochastic simulations using 127 observations from
1979Q4 to 2011Q2 and 1000 replications, to determine the number of cointegrating vectors.7
We then re-estimated the global model reducing the number of cointegrating relations
(for the 18 countries only) one by one and re-examined the PPs after each estimation to
ensure stability of the model. The nal selection of the number of cointegrating relations
are reported in Table 4. For 12 of the 18 countries we selected ri based on the trace statistic
and the simulated critical values. For four countries (China, Peru, Philippines, and the UK)
the asymptotic and simulated critical values were the same so we reduced ri until the PPs
for each country were well behaved; this was also done for Canada and Korea.
The persistence proles for the set of 23 focus countries, eleven MENA countries, ve
systemic countries and seven other oil exporters in our model (see Table 1), together with
their 95% bootstrapped error bands are provided in Figure 1. The proles overshoot for only
5 out of the 36 cointegrating vectors before quickly tending to zero. The speed of convergence
is very fast, the half-life of the shocks are generally less than 3 quarters, and equilibrium
is established before 6 years in all cases except for Egypt, Jordan and Libya. Amongst the
23 countries, Iran shows the fastest rate of convergence (around 3 years),8 and Libya the
7The estimations were done in Microt 5.0. For further technical details, see Pesaran and Pesaran (2009),
Section 22.10.
8The fast convergence for Iran is also documented in Esfahani et al. (2012b).
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Figure 1: Persistence Proles of the E¤ect of a System-wide Shock to the Coin-
tegrating Relations
Notes: Figures are median e¤ects of a system-wide shock to the cointegrating relations with 95% boot-
strapped condence bounds.
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slowest rate of convergence (8-9 years). The 95% error bands are quite tight and initially
widen somewhat before narrowing to zero. The speed of convergence, although relatively
fast, is in line with that observed for major oil exporters in Esfahani et al. (2012a).
3.4.2 Testing the Weak Exogeneity Assumption
Weak exogeneity of the country-specic foreign variables, xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
, and
the global variables, poilt and q
oil
t , with respect to the long-run parameters of the conditional
model is vital in the construction and the implementation of the GVAR model. We formally
test this assumption following the procedure in Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998). To
this end, we rst estimate the 38 VARX*(si; si ) models separately under the assumption that
the foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous. We then run the following regression
for each lth element of xit :
xit;l = il +
riX
j=1
ij;lECM
j
i;t 1 +
siX
k=1
'ik;lxi;t k +
niX
m=1
#im;lexi;t m + "it;l; (14)
where ECM ji;t 1, j = 1; 2; :::; ri are the estimated error correction terms corresponding to the
ri cointegrating relations found for the ith country model, ni = 2 (although it could be set
equal to si ), and exit = x0it ; reerit;poilt ;qoilt 0.9 Under the null hypothesis that the
variables are weakly exogenous, the error correction term must not be signicant; therefore,
the formal test for weak exogeneity is an F -test of the joint hypothesis that ij;l = 0 for
each j = 1; 2; :::; ri in equation (14). The test results together with the 95% critical values
are reported in Table 5, from which we see that the weak exogeneity assumption cannot be
rejected for the overwhelming majority of the variables considered. In fact, only 7 out of 263
exogeneity tests turned out to be statistically signicant at the 5% level.
More specically, in terms of the variables in xit, only foreign output in the Indonesian
model and foreign short-term interest rates in the model for Argentina, Japan, and Nigeria
cannot be considered as weakly exogenous. This assumption is also rejected for the price of
oil in the Canadian model, and oil production in the Euro Area and Iranian models. However,
considering the signicance level assumed here, even if the weak exogeneity assumption is
always valid, we would expect up to 14 rejections, 5% of the 263 tests. Overall, the available
evidence in Table 5, therefore, supports our treatment of the foreign and global variables in
the individual VARX* models as weakly exogenous.
9Note that the models for U.S. and the GCC are specied di¤erently, see the discussion in Section 3.3.
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Table 5: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specic
Foreign Variables, Oil Prices, and Oil Production
Notes: * denotes statistical signicance at the 5% level.
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3.4.3 Testing for Structural Breaks
Although the possibility of structural breaks is a fundamental problem in macroeconomic
modelling in general, this is more likely to be a concern for a particular set of countries in
our sample (i.e., emerging economies and non-OECD oil exporters) which have experienced
both social and political changes since 1979. However, given that the individual VARX*
models are specied conditional on the foreign variables in xit, they are more robust to the
possibility of structural breaks in comparison to reduced-form VARs, as the GVAR setup
can readily accommodate co-breaking. See Dees et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion.
We test the null of parameter stability using the residuals from the individual reduced-
form error correction equations of the country-specic VARX*(si; si )models, initially looking
at the maximal OLS cumulative sum statistic (PKsup) and its mean square variant (PKmsq)
of Ploberger and Krämer (1992). We also test for parameter constancy over time against
non-stationary alternatives as proposed by Nyblom (1989) (NY ), and consider sequential
Wald statistics for a single break at an unknown change point. More specically, the mean
Wald statistic of Hansen (1992) (MW ), the Wald form of the Quandt (1960) likelihood
ratio statistic (QLR), and the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) Wald statistics based on the
exponential average (APW ). Finally, we also examine the heteroscedasticity-robust versions
of NY , MW , QLR, and APW:
Table 6: Number of Rejections of the Null of Parameter Constancy per Variable
Across the Country-Specic Models at the 5 Percent Signicance Level
Tests y  eq (e  p) rS rL Total
PKsup 5 4 2 1 2 0 14(7:8)
PKmsq 4 1 0 1 0 0 6(3:4)
NY 8 5 4 5 4 6 32(17:9)
robust-NY 5 2 5 2 1 3 18(10:1)
QLR 22 18 20 18 9 7 94(52:5)
robust-QLR 6 4 6 2 6 4 28(15:6)
MW 12 10 10 9 6 6 53(29:6)
robust-MW 10 6 3 3 6 5 33(18:4)
APW 17 18 20 18 9 7 89(49:7)
robust-APW 7 5 6 3 6 4 31(17:3)
Notes: The test statistics PKsup and PKmsq are based on the cumulative sums of OLS residuals, NY is the
Nyblom test for time-varying parameters and QLR, MW and APW are the sequential Wald statistics for a
single break at an unknown change point. Statistics with the prex robustdenote the heteroskedasticity-
robust version of the tests. All tests are implemented at the 5% signicance level. The number in brackets
are the percentage rejection rates.
Table 6 presents the number of rejections of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy
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per variable across the country-specic models at the 5% signicance level. For brevity,
test statistics and bootstrapped critical values are not reported here, but are available on
request. Overall, it seems that most regression coe¢ cients are stable; however, the results
vary considerably across di¤erent tests. In the case of the two PK tests, the null hypothesis
is rejected between 3.47.8% of the time. For the NY , MW , QLR; and APW tests on
the other hand, we note that the rejection rate is much larger, between 17.952.5%. The
QLR and APW rejection rates, for the joint null hypothesis of coe¢ cient and error variance
stability, are particularly high with 94 and 89 cases, respectively, out of 179 being rejected.
However, looking at the robust version of these tests, we note that the rejection rate falls
considerably to between 10.1% and 18.4%. Therefore, although we nd some evidence for
structural instability, it seems that possible changes in error variances rather than parameter
coe¢ cients is the main reason for this. We deal with this issue by using bootstrapped means
and condence bounds when undertaking the impulse response analysis discussed later.
4 Inward Spillovers
This section studies whether the increasing economic integration at the world level and the
resulting emergence of large economic players, such as China, have weakened the role of the
U.S. economy or the Euro Area as drivers of global growth. To do so, we look at the e¤ects
of negative U.S., Euro Area, and Chinese real output shocks on the MENA region, other oil
exporters, and systemic economies.10
4.1 Shock to U.S. GDP
As a result of the dominance of the United States in the world economy, any slowdown in
this country can bring about negative spillovers to other economies. As the recent global
economic crisis has shown, the history of past U.S. recessions usually coincides with sig-
nicant reductions in global growth. Furthermore, the continuing dominance of U.S. debt
and equity markets, backed by the still-strong global role of the U.S. dollar, is also play-
ing an important role. The results of our GVAR model, presented in Figure 2b, show rst
that countries with a substantial trade exposure to the U.S. economy have a relatively large
sensitivity to U.S. developments. Specically, in response to a one percent decline in U.S.
GDP, Canadian (70%), Mexican (69%), and Nigerian (36%) real outputs fall by 0:37, 0:56,
10Due to model and parameter uncertainties, and the possibility of measurement errors in the data (for the
MENA countries in particular), the condence intervals produced for di¤erent MENA countries are generally
wide. In this case, the median responses are mainly used for inference as they contain useful information
about the direction of the responses and their magnitudes.
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and 0:66 percent respectively, with this e¤ect being statistically signicant (the numbers in
brackets are corresponding trade weights which are reported in Table 7).
However, even for countries that do not trade as much with the U.S., they are largely
inuenced by its dominance through other partnerstrade. For instance, following a negative
U.S. GDP shock, the Euro Area (16%), Norway (6%), and UK (13%) real outputs fall by
between 0:16 and 0:29 percent per annum, with these median e¤ects being statistically
signicant. Overall, the inuence of the U.S. on other economies remains larger than direct
trade ties would suggest, owing to third-market e¤ects together with increased nancial
integration that tends to foster the international transmission of business cycles.
In general, lower demand for commodities is another channel through which a negative
U.S. shock a¤ects countries. In particular, about 27% of world oil demand comes from
the U.S., so it is not surprising that in response to the U.S. shock, both oil prices and
production levels decline, with the latter e¤ect being statistically signicant (see Figure 3).
The oil channel has a negative impact on the MENA countries, where on average, their GDPs
fall between 0.170.29% after one year. For the GCC, exporting around 30% of world oil,
this e¤ect is larger and statistically signicant: real output declines as much as 0:41%. The
median e¤ects of a negative U.S. output shock for other systemic countries and major oil
exporters are generally negative, with those few that have a positive median impacts being
statistically insignicant.11
To investigate whether the global impact of a U.S. negative output shock has changed
over the past two decades, we re-estimated our model using trade weights averaged over 1986
to 1988 (see Table 8). Comparing these results, as illustrated in Figure 2a, with those from
our original specication using trade weights between 2006 and 2008 in Figure 2b, we note
that the impact of this shock has remained very similar over the past 20 years. This nding
suggests that the inuence of the U.S. on the global economy remains very prominent.
These results are robust to di¤erent ways of constructing the weights, wij. In particular,
we experimented with using exports weights and found the impulse responses to be very
similar to those with trade weights. Therefore, as is now standard in the literature, we
only report the results with the weights calculated as the average of exports and imports of
country i with j (Tables 7 and 8).
11The output response of China to a negative U.S. shock is not statistically di¤erent from zero. This
response could arise from the inuence of third country (indirect) e¤ects emanating from non-U.S. trading
partners of China. Identication of the direct e¤ect of the U.S. shock on China is beyond the scope of this
paper, but is an issue for further investigation.
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Figure 2: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to a Negative
GDP Shock in the United States (Relative to the U.S.)
(a) Trade Weights Averaged Over 19861988 (b) Trade Weights Averaged Over 20062008
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% decline in U.S. GDP,
together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
Figure 3: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Oil Prices and Supply
(a) Oil Price (b) Oil Supply
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in oil price and production associated with a negative/positive unit
shock (equal to one standard error) to the GDP of corresponding economy or region, together with the 16th
and 84th percentile error bands. These responses are based on trade weights averaged over 20062008.
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4.2 Shock to Euro Area GDP
We initially shocked the Euro Area GDP, but obtained extremely small (and not statistically
di¤erent from zero) median responses on both oil prices and production levels. Figure 3
shows that the responses of these two variables to negative GDP shocks in the U.S. and
China are much larger (and statistically signicant) compared with that of a Euro Area
shock. However, given that the Euro Area consumes around 15% of world oil, we would
expect a negative shock to its output to be associated with lower oil prices/production levels
in line with that of a Chinese shock, in particular given that over the same period, Chinas
consumption of oil was around 5% of the world total (one-third that of the Euro Area).
To obtain reasonable estimates, which are in line with economic theory, we imposed sign
restrictions on the generalized impulse responses of the oil price and supply variables, such
that a negative Euro Area shock is contemporaneously associated with a decline in both of
these variables. For more details on sign restrictions within a GVAR model, see Cashin et al.
(2012).
Figure 4: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to a Negative
GDP Shock in the Euro Area (Relative to the Euro Area)
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% decline in Euro Area
GDP, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
The four quarters impulse responses of output to one percent negative GDP shock in
the Euro Area, reported in Figure 4, are most signicant for Maghreb countries, reecting
their geographical proximity to the Euro Area, and the strength of their trade linkages
with Europe in general. Maghreb countries rely heavily on Europe as a market for exports
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(nearly 60 percent of Maghrebs exports are destined for Europe), as well as tourism, workers
remittances, and foreign direct investment.
Growth spillovers vary greatly from country to country. The highest dependencies are
observed for Algeria and Tunisia, with annual output elasticity of more than a half (Figure
4). Algeria is adversely a¤ected via both trade and commodity price channels. Although the
countrys share of proven oil reserves in worlds total is only about 1 percent at end-2011, it
is highly dependent on oil exports (98 percent of its exports still come from the hydrocarbon
sector), rendering it extremely vulnerable to a Euro Area shock. Specically, Algeria exports
around 42% of its oil to Europe, and given our assumption about the slowdown in the Euro
Area, demand for Algerian oil from Europe declines. However, Figure 4 also shows that the
rest of the world (including North America to which 35% of the Algerian oil is destined)
experiences a drag on its output as well. Considering this worldwide fall in oil demand,
Algeria is not able to readily shift its commodity exports (which is predominantly destined
for Europe and North America) to other countries (such as China). The country therefore
experiences a fall in oil revenues, which has a direct and large negative impact on its economy.
This commodity channel applies equally to other oil exporters in our sample, which is why
we note that a negative Euro Area shock has an adverse impact on economic activity in
these countries. Moreover, given that 68% of Algerian trade is with the Euro Area, a fall
in aggregate demand in this region has a negative impact on Algerian growth through the
trade channel.
In the case of Mashreq countries, Syria is the most a¤ected by a downturn in the Euro
Area, while the impacts on Egypt and Jordan are moderate due to their larger regional ties
with the GCC. Moreover, following a one percent decline in the Euro Area GDP, Turkish
output falls by 0:64%, with this e¤ect being highly signicant, illustrating the close trade
linkages between Turkey and the eight Euro Area countries in our sample. As for the regions
oil-exporters, a negative GDP shock in the Euro Area a¤ects their economies mainly through
its impact on oil prices and production, lowering their overall growth.
Estimated spillovers from the Euro Area to the other systemic countries, which abstract
from nancial contagion and may therefore understate the magnitude of true spillovers, are
nevertheless of meaningful size with output elasticities ranging between 0:26 and 0:57 (see
Figure 4). The response is especially interesting in the case of the UK, which has close trade
linkages with continental Europe as illustrated by a trade weight of 0:52, for which output
falls by 0:57% following a 1% drop in Euro Area GDP.
Moving beyond the systemic countries, oil exporters outside of the MENA are also ad-
versely a¤ected by the Euro Areas economic downturn through its impact on commodity
prices. More specically, the elasticities for this group of countries range between 0:17 (Nor-
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Euro Area Output
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation negative shock to Euro Area GDP
with sign restrictions on both oil prices and supply, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
The impact is in percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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way) and 0:80 (Nigeria). Figure 5 also reports the generalized impulse responses of a negative
Euro Area shock for the set of focus countries over a 40-quarter horizon and illustrates how
the responses reported in Figure 4 evolve over the long run.
4.3 Shock to Chinese GDP
A negative GDP shock in China a¤ects the economies of oil exporters in our sample mainly
through its impact on global demand for oil and associated prices. This is clearly shown in
Figure 3, as both oil prices and production levels fall signicantly in response to a negative
output shock. For oil exporters, the slowdown in China translates into lower overall economic
growth (see Figure 6b). In particular, those countries with large commodity export exposures
to China are most vulnerable to a slowdown in this country; for example, Ecuador and
Venezuela both experience a statistically signicant fall in their outputs, corresponding to
0:34% and 0:33%, respectively. In contrast, larger commodity exporters with more diversied
economies do not seem to su¤er as much, an example of the latter is Norway for which the
response is  0:04% and is not statistically di¤erent from zero.12
Turning to the systemic countries, Figure 6b shows that following a negative GDP shock
in China, the output of the other four systemic countries falls, with the average e¤ect being
 0:15% and statistically signicant. Moreover, China has a large (signicant) and growing
impact on MENA countries and other oil exporters.13 This nding is expected given the
emergence of China as a key driver of the global economy over recent decades. In fact,
re-estimating our model with trade weights averaged over 198688, we note that 20 years
ago, a negative Chinese output shock would not have had a statistically signicant e¤ect
on either the systemic economies, major oil exporters, or the MENA region (see Figure 6a).
Comparing the results in Figure 6 we note that not only does a Chinese GDP shock a¤ect
the global economy in a much more prominent way, but the median e¤ects are generally
much larger than two decades ago.
These results are consistent with the ndings in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2011), who argue
that the reason why Latin American economies recovered much faster than initially antici-
pated from the recent global crisis was due to their increasing trade linkages with China. We
also argue that the emergence of China as a driver of growth in the world economy might
help to explain the "lower-than-expected" e¤ect of the global crisis on MENA countries and
other emerging economies. Indeed, we show that the MENA countriesgrowth is not only
12See also Roache (2012) and International Monetary Fund (2012) for a detailed discussion on the outward
spillovers from China through commodity price channels.
13The results for the other countries in our sample, listed in Table 1, are not reported here, but are
available on request.
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dependent on the United States and Europe, but also on the fast-growing Chinese economy.
Figure 6: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to a Negative
GDP Shock in China (Relative to China)
(a) Trade Weights Averaged Over 19861988 (b) Trade Weights Averaged Over 20062008
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% decline in Chinese
GDP, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
5 Outward Spillovers
A positive GDP shock in the GCC region generates signicant output gains in Jordan and
Syria, 0.43% and 0.34% after a year, respectively, together with mild to moderate output
spillovers to the rest of the MENA, the e¤ect ranging from a low of 3% (Tunisia) to a high
of 43% (Algeria) see Figure 7b. Spillovers from the GCC to the wider MENA region are
transmitted via trade, remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), and commodity price
channels. The macroeconomic situation in Jordan, for example, is closely tied to those of
other countries in the Middle East. Remittances from Jordanians working in the region are
an important source of national income (equivalent to 1520 percent of GDP); the Persian
Gulf region is the primary destination for Jordanian exports, and in turn, supplies most of
its energy requirements; furthermore, the country receives substantial grants and FDI from
other states in the region (see Mohaddes and Raissi (2011)).
Subject to data availability, it is of course relatively straightforward to augment the
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country-specic VARX* models with other aggregate variables such as consumption and
investment, or particular variables of interest, for instance remittances, FDI, and grants.
However, the inclusion of these variables is unlikely to alter the long-run relationship that we
have estimated between xit, xit, and the global variables if each of consumption, investment,
remittances, FDI, and grants are cointegrated with, for instance, output or oil prices. This
is because any linear combination of cointegrating relations will also be cointegrated. To
illustrate this point, Esfahani et al. (2012b) estimate a cointegrating VAR(2) model for
investment and oil export revenues for Iran and nd that the hypothesis that the long-run
elasticity of investment to real oil income is unity cannot be rejected. They also show that
the exactly identied cointegrating relation between log real output and consumption is given
by ct = yt + t where t is a mean zero stationary process. Similarly, Mohaddes and Raissi
(2011) estimate a cointegrating VAR(2) model for external income (the sum of remittances,
grants, and foreign direct investment) and oil prices, and nd that latter represent a good
proxy for external income in the Jordanian economy. The above results show that, from a
long-run perspective, only one of the variables in the corresponding cointegrating relation
needs to be included in the country specic models.
Figure 7b also shows the extent to which the output of the GCC a¤ects, and is a¤ected
by the global economy, in particular systemic countries but also other oil-exporters.14 Specif-
ically, the oil market provides an important channel of impact: for example, Saudi Arabia,
being part of the GCC, is currently the largest oil exporter in the world and is at present
the only producer with signicant spare capacity that can be used to stabilize global energy
markets. While the level of oil supply from the GCC has signicant macroeconomic e¤ects
on developed and emerging economies, raising global growth prospects has an important
impact on the demand for oil and hence the economic performance of the GCC. Given a
near-vertical global oil supply curve, the increase in output in the GCC region is mainly
induced by rising oil prices (Figure 3). This increase in poilt coincides with higher outputs
in systemic countries, reecting a demand-driven oil price spike, and higher GDP levels in
other commodity producers, most of which are statistically signicant (see Figure 7b).
We performed the same exercise as above, but now adding Algeria, Iran and Libya to
the GCC block, calling the nine combined countries MENA oil exporters (MENAEX). These
countries include seven out of the current 12 OPEC member countries, supply over 41% of
world oil exports, and possess a majority of the total proven oil reserves in the world. As
Figure 8b shows, the results from a positive MENAEX output shock are more pronounced
when compared with a GCC shock, but the channels of impact are unchanged.
14For panel applications studing the growth e¤ects of higher commodity prices, see Cavalcanti et al.
(2011b), Cavalcanti et al. (2011a), and Cavalcanti et al. (2012).
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Figure 7: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to a Positive
GDP Shock in the GCC Region (Relative to the GCC)
(a) Trade Weights Averaged Over 19861988 (b) Trade Weights Averaged Over 20062008
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% increase in GCC
countriesGDP, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
Figure 8: Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to a Positive
GDP Shock in the MENA Oil Exporters (Relative to the MENAEX)
(a) Trade Weights Averaged Over 19861988 (b) Trade Weights Averaged Over 20062008
Notes: Depicts annual percent change in output of a given country associated with 1% increase in MENA
oil exportersGDP, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
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To see whether the impact of a positive GDP shock in the GCC and the MENA oil
exporters have changed over the past few decades, we re-estimated our model using 1986
1988 trade weights. Figures 7a and 8a show that the e¤ect of these shocks for the region, as
well as for the global economy, has not di¤ered much over the past 20 years. This is perhaps
not surprising, given that crude oil was and remains the largest exportable and driver of
growth in the region, see for instance Esfahani et al. (2012a).
6 Concluding Remarks
In this study we estimated a GVAR model for 38 countries/regions (which includes the GCC
countries in particular and the Middle East and North Africa region in general, as well as
other major oil-exporters) over the period 1979Q22011Q2 to analyze the inwards/outwards
output spillovers to/from the MENA countries. We also investigated the growing impact of
Chinas macroeconomic shocks (compared to the U.S. and the Euro Area) on other systemic
economies, the MENA region, and other major oil exporters; and examined how the trans-
mission of shocks has changed following the emergence of China as a major driver of the
world economy.
The results show that output spillovers from China, the Euro Area, and the U.S. to other
systemic economies, as well as the MENA region and other oil exporters, are meaningful.
Specically, the impact of a negative Euro Area GDP shock on MENA economies are modest,
and on par with a shock to the GDP of the United States. However, the impact of a shock to
output in China is more substantial (being statistically signicant in more cases), reecting
the direction of evolving trade patterns, and Chinas growing role in the global economy
and the global oil market in particular. We also nd that outward spillovers from the GCC
and MENA oil exporters are likely to be stronger in their immediate geographical proximity,
although they also have implications for the systemic economies and the rest of the oil
exporters.
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Data Appendix
Real GDP
We use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases to compile the real GDP data. The 18 countries
that we add to the GVAR dataset of Smith and Galesi (2010) are divided into two groups.
First, those for which quarterly data are available. Second, those for which annual data are
available.
For the rst group (Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia), we use the
IFS 99BVPZF series (GDP VOL) when available quarterly data on GDP are reported since
1991Q1, 2002Q1, 1988Q1, 1992Q1, 1990Q1, and 2000Q1 for Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively. We seasonally adjust these quarterly observations using
the U.S. Census Bureaus X-12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program.15 Quarterly series
are then interpolated (backwards) linearly from the annual series either from the IFS or
WEO using the same method as that applied by Dees et al. (2007).
For the second group (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, Syria, Venezuela, and UAE), either the annual seasonally unadjusted IFS
series (BVPZF and B..ZF) or the WEO real GDP series are interpolated to obtain the
quarterly values. These series are then treated as the quarterly seasonally unadjusted data.
Consumer price index
We obtain seasonally adjusted quarterly observations on the consumer price index (CPI)
for all added countries from the International Monetary Funds INS database. Quarterly
data on CPI are available since 1991Q1, 1980Q1, 2003Q2, and 1980Q1 for Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, respectively. Annual WEO CPI series are interpolated
linearly (backwards) to obtain quarterly observations for the missing values for these four
countries.
Exchange rates
The IFS AE.ZF series are collected for all added 18 countries from the IMF IFS database.
15For further information see U.S. Census Bureau (2007): X-12-ARIMA Reference Manual at
http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/
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Short term interest rates
The IMF IFS database is the main source of data for short term interest rates. The IFS
discount rate (60...ZF series) is used for Algeria, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania,
and Venezuela. The IFS deposit rate (60L..ZF series) is used for Bahrain, Egypt, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, and Syria. The IFS three-month interbank deposit rate or the money market
rate (60B..ZF series) is used for Kuwait and Tunisia.
PPP-GDP weights
The main source for the country-specic GDP weights is the World Development Indicator
database of the World Bank.
Trade matrices
To construct the trade matrices, we use the direction of trade statistics from the International
Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. For all the countries
considered we downloaded the matrix of exports and imports (c.i.f.) with annual frequency.
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